Digital Commons @ George Fox University
George Fox College Journal, 1952-1966

Archives and Museum

Summer 1961

Some Aspects of the Timber Industry In Canadian-American
Relations: The 1958 Faculty Lecture
Mackey W. Hill

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/gfc_journal
Part of the History Commons, and the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Hill, Mackey W., "Some Aspects of the Timber Industry In Canadian-American Relations: The 1958 Faculty
Lecture" (1961). George Fox College Journal, 1952-1966. 6.
https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/gfc_journal/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archives and Museum at Digital Commons @ George
Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in George Fox College Journal, 1952-1966 by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact
arolfe@georgefox.edu.

George Fox College library
Newberg. n"pr'""

George Fox College

J��R�Al
1961

NO.1

Some Aspects of the Timber Industry
In Canadian--American Relations
THE 1958 FACULTY LECTURE

BY MACKEY w. HILL
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

INTRODUCTION
In this study I have undertaken to survey briefly the
establishment and expansion of the timber industries in North
America in the areas of the United States and Canada. It is
an attempt to see the timber industry in a larger context than
one nation on the American continent. It is an attempt to see
it in its relationships to some of the major constitutional and
economic currents of the times: mercantilism, free trade of
the Reciprocity period, and the pressures of high tariff pro
tectionism that was induced by the competition of political
and economic nationalism. The study is divided chronological
ly as follows:
I.
The Early Development of the Timber Industry.
II. The Timber Industry in the Early 19th Century.
III. The Timber Industry in the Late 19th Century.
IV. Early 20th Century Trends in the Timber Industry.
I.

Early Development of the Timber Industry
in North America

It was announced to the European world as early as
1584 by Hakluyt that timber resources of America were ade
quate to supply all European demand. The importance of

American supply to meet the English demand for masts and
other normal stores was recognized early by Captain John
Smith in the colonizing enterprise in Virginia. In New Eng
land the expectation of exploiting forest resources was a fac
tor in the chartering of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The
Council for New England boldly affirmed its confidence in
1622 in the ability of the colonies to duplicate almost any
thing that was then manufactured in Europe.l
Timber occupied one of the highest priorities for the Eng
lish as strategic defense material. One of the strong and
dominating motives behind English colonization of America
was to obtain control of a dependable and potentially inex
haustible supply of quality timber. The English Navy,
along with every other European navy, relied greatly upon
timber and naval stores with which to keep their navies in
trim. When the first ones arrived in England from America,
the white pine masts were such a sensation to the British
Naval Board that the Board decided immediately to guaran
tee a continuing supply for the English Navy. Contracts were
let to American timber agents at substantial rates. Many were
bought for 100 pounds, English money, per mast timber.2
Wood served the purposes which later steel was made to serve.
Wood was used in the place of iron products when the cast
iron was too brittle, when wrought iron was too flexible, or
when steel proved too expensive. Vihite pine was particularly
adaptable to the need for masts and spars.
Thus, the timber industry responded to effective demand.
It wa.s found that in the 17th century the procuring of mast
timber was quite profitable. The English bounty on this
product enhanced its value greatly. For example, the floor
on the prices of good mast timber was maintained so high
that it could bring from 95 to 115 pounds English money.
Some of these masts were so huge that it required twenty teams
of oxen to pull them to the water. The response to this de
mand was so energetic that within a century the coast from
Boston to the Kennebec River and for six miles inland had
been stripped of these trees. The. most suitable trees to this
end were properly marked by the royal officials to be reserved
for these purposes.
New Hampshire and Maine took an early lead in pro-

clueing the greatest volume of lumber for export. Great
fortunes were realized in lumber at this time by the timber
agents who were working under contract with the Crown.
Mark Wentworth, for example, a brother to a colonial gov
ernor, made a substantial fortune in the timber industry. It
was said that a mill that could be operated by a man and a
boy could be very profitable.
Forestry product workers of Northeastern Canada and
the United States, although economic rivals and political
competitors, were a part of a common prosperous section.
Their versatility and capability enabled them to realize ma
terial success in many pursuits.
The timber business began as soon as the settlers of
New England got well settled. Presently exploitation to meet
the persistent demands became so intensive that the first
conservation laws were enacted. However, conservation was
pretty well ignored. This wastefulness and prodigality with
the riches of timber resources that began with the erection
of the first mill in about 1623 persisted until the greater part
of the virgin pine forests were harvested.
There were other controls that were established in law
and practice. Some of these controls were the brunt of con
troversies that lasted for decades and were decisive factors
in bringing on the Revolution. Especially were Maine and
New Hampshire a storm center over the imperial policy. In
this England attempted to enforce the Crown's exclusive claim
to all the choice timber on the public land, the so called
Crown lands. This policy of control over the choice white
pine timber by the Crown was begun during the reign of
Britain's William and Mary. By royal decree the choicest
specimen of the white pine were reserved for the Royal
Navy. It was designated as strategic defence material. The
English lack of this at home and her desperate need of it in
order to carry out the functions of her empire may account
for her jealous attitude concerning the pioneer's capricious
wastefulness of timber. The pioneer frequently disregarded
this Royal order, penetrated well beyond the land-grant limits
into this that was considered by the Administration as the
Royal Domain or Crown Lands, and here he proceeded to fell
the trees and hew himself a farm out of this wilderness.

To the settlers this land was not to be capriciously dis
posed of in London by land speculators in the King's for
tune, for to them, this was Indian country free for the tak
ing and a menace if not taken. Un-exploited timber reserves
meant land placed beyond the use of white men. If unset
tled and unappropriated by white men than it remained a
kind of beachhead for Indian forays into the white settle
ments. This kind of policy nurtured the settlers' closest and
worst enemies. Thus the forests kept in reserve may have
assured London of security against potential enemies in Spain,
France, or Holland. But to the settlers these reserves were
the impregnable fortresses for their worst savage enemy. The
Red man was enemy number one to most of the American
settlers. Consequently what Royal officials called timber
stealing was considered from the settlers' point of view highly
commendable achievements in the establishment of civiliza
tion.
Early in the American Revolution, the American learn
ed to appreciate the importance of white pine as a strategic
material in the military and naval struggle. Trade in white
pine mast wood was banned, for pine masts placed in British
hands meant ships of war and loads of men armed against
America. For the most part, the American lumbermen were
loyal to the Revolutionary cause. Several masts-ships were
captured along with the British agent and mastwrights on
the Kennebec River. Men of Maine thwarted British efforts
to fit and sail out of port a mast ship in Falmouth. The
Patriots captured a great supply of masts on Stawberry Bank
in Portsmouth. A little after the Battle of Bunker Hill,
England received her last shipment of white pine from
America during the Revolution. She had to draw on her
reserves and what she could get from Scandinavia. A white
pine tree was featured prominently on the first flag of the
American Revolution.
With the coming of the American Revolution the tim
ber markets in the British West Indies and in Britain were
closed to Americans. Only the non-British West Indies was
legally open to American trade. New England was thus hit
hard, and the timber industry there, particularly, had to limit
its production to that of supplying local demand and coast

wise trade. In fact, New England's exclusion from shipping
rights to the West Indies affected the New England economy
so adversely that it became at times a cross for her to remain
whole heartedly in the American Union. The diplomatic
struggle between America as a young nation and Britain
( 1783-1830) pivoted about the concern for this trade in the
West Indies. Under mercantilism, England was anxious and
determined to maintain dominance there while New Eng
land was determined and eager to secure re-entrance into this
market.3
However, soon such markets as Boston and New York
began to take on new significance as postwar expansion be
gan. With this constant demand for forest products as a stim
ulus, exploitation worked farther and farther up the coast and
higher up the rivers and river valleys.
After they had won their independence, New England
ers turned again to their rich pine resources. The story of
white pine lumbering has been called "the greatest chapter
in the history of any nation's forests." This story includes
the account of the lumber jack, the lumber baron and the
rapid exploitation of the supply of white pine. The story of
white pine has been summarized as follows:
To

sum up a mighty epic in a few poor lines-it was
under the boughs of the White Pine that there evolved
the greatest woodsmen the world has ever seen, the
American lumberjack (though much of the time he
was a Finn, Dane, Swede, Norwegian, or Russian by
birth), an embodiment in himself of the Paul Bunyan
legend, a hero of courage and skill amidst toppling
giants and river jams, a demon of accelerating de
struction.4

The ship-building industry constituted a persistent de
mand on the timber business. England was the chief ship
building power. However, there was shipbuilding from South
Carolina to New Brunswick. Ship-building was an ancient
and honorable business. John Smith had led the way and
began to construct small boats that were adapted to the colon
ists' immediate needs. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode
Island surged ahead in the development of a thriving major
industry in their shipbuilding business.

II.

The Timber Industry in the Early 19th Cen.tury

Wood was Canada's primary product before wheat moved
ahead. The fact that the British market was a great distance
away was a discouragement for business to invest in the tim
ber industry with any assurance of satisfactory returns. But
after 1808 the tremendous preference that was put on forest
products and the persistent demands of the needs of war
established the industry so that thereafter it became the main
reliance of a great part of the country. Only the railroad
helped to extend her radius beyond the watershed of the St.
Lawrence and the Maritimes.
Before 1850 the chief product of the timber industry was
square timber making. This practice crept up the river and
its tributaries as far as southern Lake Huron. Second only
to squared timber was sawn lumber. It largely utilized water
transportation. Consequently it was tied to water routes until
the railroad came in. Export trade to the American market
began in 1835. The market was first to eastern United States,
but it followed the settlements westward. The volume of
export trade from Canada in meeting this enlarging demand
grew, until it far exceeded the trade with Britain.5
Certain prominent American cities became centers of
continuing demand for timber products in the form of a
valuable item for trade for their merchants and also as indis
pensable building materials for their own program of con
struction and expansion. Particularly, American cities that
were located along the coast, came early to realize that their
future prosperity was dependent on their proper identification
with the hinterland. Boston succeeded in pushing through
the construction of a railroad that connected her with the
Hudson River and thence to Ogdenburg on the St. Lawrence.
From here, railroad connections were later established with
Ottawa. Portland, Maine succeeded in getting railroad con
nection in the Grand Trunk line through to the vicinity of
Montreal.
New York City, on the other hand, before the day of
the railroad, extended her contact with the interior by the ex
tension of the natural and artificial water ways. One of these
was formed by opening the channel through the Hudson
River northward to Lake Champlain by way of the Cham-

plain Canal (1822). Earlier, Lake Champlain had been con
nected with the St. Lawrence River by way of the Richelieu
Canal. Thus, by way of river, canals and a lake, New York
had a through water transport route to the St. Lawrence
River and the Canadian economy which the St. Lawrence
tied together. But the largest water transport project of all
was that of connecting Lake Erie with the Hudson River
through the construction of the Erie Canal by way of the
Mohawk Valley. It was opened in 1825. This route estab
lished an effective channel through which trade could flow
into and out of the great interior of America including both
the Great Lakes basin and the Mississippi River basin.
Lake Ontario was connected with the Erie Canal by way of
the Oswego Canal. Timber products that had gone earlier from
Vermont by way of the Richelieu Canal, the St. Lawrence
River, Quebec and thence to England now went to New
York. Thus the timber also on the American side of Lake
Ontario found its way eventually through the Oswego-Erie
Canals to the Port of New York City. With these advan
tages in water transportation, New York City successfully
challenged Montreal's ancient domination of the Upper Can
ada economy. It was demonstrated presently that Upper
Canada could get better prices for their goods, buy more
cheaply and pay less freight by way of New York.
Transportation, thus, became an important factor in in
tensifying the demand for forest products. The completion of
the canal systems established a condition which made the
American market demand more effective. The canal projects
-the Champlain-Hudson River, the Erie Canal, and the Os
wego feeder to the Erie Canal-marked the beginning of the
"internal improvement" movement both in Canada and in
the United States. Canadian canal building paralleled and
rivaled the American projects. The Lachine Canal opened in
1825. Weiland Canal opened in 1830. The Chambly Canal
by 1835 provided a route to New York through Lake Cham
plain and the American canal and river systems. By 1849,
Canadian canals had been built so that the dangers of the
three areas of rapids in the St. Lawrence River could be
avoided. The Rideau Canal from Kingston to Ottawa and
the Greenville Canal on the Ottawa River gave water con-

nection between Lake Ontario and Montreal. Thus, within
thirteen years navigation by barges and small crafts was
made possible with two outlets to the sea from the Lake On
tario region and dependable connections were established be
tween Montreal and New York City.6
Interior export trade to the United States before 1827
was completely absent from Canada as the records show at
St. John on the Richelieu, the most representative of the in
land ports of Canada. In fact, St. John had been for years
the only port of entry to the United States from Lower Can
ada. The year 1827 marks the beginning of Canadian ex
port trade of any size by way of St. John to the United
States. The volume of exports varied. They increased
moderately until 183 1 when they dwindled. By 1835 again
they picked up until 1842 when again it rapidly declined.
By 1835, the tremendous pull of the American market
became obvious. The United States was experiencing the
phenomenal expansion of the Jacksonian period. This ex
panding market demand was felt not only in Lower but also
in Upper Canada. The American demand area was dispers
ed and extended through the sections that were undergoing
rapid growth. The response of the Canadians to fill this
need was equally dispersed. Because of the better prices on
lumber in the American market, even the small mills turn
ed from cutting "deals" for the British market in "deal"
boards to the production of lumber for the American market.
Upper Canada manifested the same response to the United
States market, for with the Canadian and American canal
systems providing the channels for this trade, Upper Can
ada reacted as Lower Canada had to the demands of the Unit
ed States market. For example, by 1836, trade with America
had taken precedent over every other demand.7
There were changes in the political order during this
period that had important implications on both the timber
industry and Canadian-American relations. Among these were
the British liquidation of Mercantilism as a dominant power
in the empire, the developments toward Responsible Govern
ment for Canada, and the problems of aggression against
the respective countries. We will consider the all-important
problem of free trade and protection in the section on tariffs.

In the revolts of 1837-1838 men from both Canada and
the United States were involved in the designs on Canada.
William L. Mackinzie, a Canadian, was one of the promin
ent leaders in these troubles. There were various individual
Americans and American groups near the Canadian border
who were implicated by giving aid of some kind to the move
ments against Canada at this time. After some forays into
Canada, with considerable property damage in some places,
the movement was defeated by decisive Canadian military ac
cion. The Canadians executed a surprise attack on the base
where military materials were being stored in preparation for
an all-out effort against Canada. Among other things,
che Canadians seized and burned an American Naval steam
er, the Caroline.
These acts of violence so aroused the United States gov
ernment that, eventually, the President of the United States
took effective action in the American part of this area to
maintain strict neutrality, but Britain's attention was drawn
to a serious consideration of Canada's more critical political
problems. While Lord Durham was under appointment as
Governor of Canada, he was under instruction to make a
careful study and report his findings concerning the Can
adian situation. Ten years after his appointment, political
and economic disturbances had become so acute that there
was serious consideration of annexation to the United States.9
There were causes for the changes that were brought
about in the British Empire in the 1840's. One cause was the
triumph of economic and political school of thought that
was opposed to the prevailing principles of mercantilism.
This opposition to mercantilism is sometimes called the "Man
chester School." By 1846 it had triumphed in England in the
repeal of the Corn Laws. This marked the emergence of
England into a policy of free trade. The economic results of
this new policy in Canada was nothing short of a catastrophe
to the farmer, to the lumberman, and to the exporting mer
chant. Moreover, it proved highly unstabilizing to the basis
for credit:
The reaction of this British policy on Canadian econ
omic life was almost immediately disastrous. Prior to
1846 Canadian farm and forest products had enjoyed
preferential treatment in British markets, a fact that

gave assurance to the farmer or lumberman and fa
cilitated the procuring of credit. Now this preference
was wiped away and the products of Canada were
forced into competition with the output of the United
States and other countries.lO

The merchant class was particularly hit hard. The
commercial order for which they had striven for years, they
considered, was betrayed by the British action. In New
Brunswick, prosperity was based altogether on timber trade
under the old system. It was no less true in other parts of
Canada. To add further to their troubles, the new American
tariff schedule in 1846 closed the door against Canadian wood
before that door was really open.
We have noticed some things that adversely affected the
Canadian economy. One of these was the British removal of
preferential duties. Also at this particular time the United
States enacted the bonding act. The American Bonding Act
was a piece of legislation that allowed goods to pass through
the territory of the United States duty free. This provision
granted Upper Canada relief from the domination of the
middlemen at Montreal and allowed the goods of Upper
Canada to move more directly to the world market. It gave
to the routes and channels through New York the burden
and the profit of the traffic just at a time when Canada was
called to pay the heavy cost of internal improvement. An
other thing that affected the Canadian economy adversely
at this time was the fact that the British Navigation Laws
that were yet in effect acted to reduce the volume of Canadian
world trade. It kept the freight rates hiked far higher than
in American ports, and thus drove trade through American
channels. Over production of timber products threatened
great sections of the industry at this time with bankruptcy.
Paralleling this crisis in timber was the crash in the flour
milling industry when the preferential advantages to wheat
were removed. Over expansion ruined many:
After 1846, Canada for the first time had to stand on
its own feet and it was not a pleasant experience.
But the country soon turned to the obvious expedient.
It could expect no favors from the parent state, it
might be able to do something with its neighbor.
Hence the beginning of the re-orientation of Canadian
trade, a process well under way before the Reciprocity
Treaty of 1854, but probably hastened by that treaty.u

American lumbermen and American investors had en
countered difficulties when they attempted to gain entrance
into the timber business in New Brunswick. Provincial policy
allowed individuals and companies to purchase timber land,
but no alien was allowed the right of ownership. Naturalized
citizens could become so only by conforming first to the
Established Church. At first Americans were denied all
rights of purchase and ownership of timber land, but after
two years the feeling grew that it was necessary for the proper
development of the country to admit American capital. The
attorney general ruled that all companies organized by Amer
icans must have British members in the concern. Presently,
the organization of this kind of corporation began to reach
the proportions of a mania. Frequently it was found, more
over, that the prominent members of the legislature owned
shares in these companies.12
Most holdings were acquired through purchase by the
various individuals and timber companies. Monoply was de
veloping. One company owned 500,000 acres by 1834.13
The timber industry began a climb out of depression in
the 1849's and 1850's. The market in Britain picked up
some. The American demand grew, and access to the Amer
ican market loosened up a bit. The railroad came to play an
increasingly important part in the timber trade with America,
particularly, after 1845. The Ottawa Valley became the chief
center of exploitation at this time. The trade found the way
down through Quebec to Britain, up the Richelieu Canal to
Lake Champlain, or through the Rideau Canal and Oswego to
the New York market. Canadian shippers found that it was
cheaper to send goods via New York to the world market than
through the regular channel of Lower Canada and thence to
the destined market. For example, a ton of grain from Chicago
to Liverpool via Montreal cost $13.75, while via New York
it cost only $10.50.14
The decade of 1850-1860 saw the empire of the white
pine move from the lower to the upper Great Lakes.15 It
had taken a little over fifty years to take off the cream of
the white and red pine forests that reach from Gaspe to De
troit. By 1850 waterways had reached their highest useful
ness in the area from the Atlantic coast to Wisconsin.16 In

this section the railroad proved to be increasingly the success
ful competitor to water transportation.
By 1850 the Lake Erie counties were the largest pro
ducers of lumber in Upper Canada with the Lake Ontario
area in second place.
The lumber trade only turned the corner northward in
Lake Huron by the time of the passage of the Reciprocity
Treaty. During the Reciprocity period the great Chicago
market was opened up.
The lumbermen were only to Saginaw Bay up Lake
Michigan by 1858. During this period the pine of the upper
peninsula of Michigan and of Wisconsin and of the coun
try contributing to the American side of Lake Huron and
Lake Michigan began to be harvested. The Canadian region
most affected was that of Georgian Bay. South of the Bay,
mills were soon built and a beginning was made on the har
vest of the timber here. Some licenses for timber cutting on
the "North Shore" were granted as early as 1852 but most
of these lapsed back to the government. In 1863 strips were
sold in the North in the area of Algoma. The first large
mill was built here in 1864. However, it was not until eight
or ten years later that exploitation began here in earnest.
It was then that the great timber limit sales began.17
A multitude of American lumbering firms as well as
lumbermen were busy helping harvest Canadian forest re
sources.18 There was extensive expansion and development
in the mill equipment among the American firms so that some
of these were turning out from fifteen million to thirty mil
lion feet of lumber per year. Also, the rise of the expanding
demand for lumber in Chicago convinced the Canadians, as
nothing else, that here they had a dependable alternative to
the demand for square timber that had been centered in Quebec.
III.

The Timber Industry in the Late 19th Century

Between 1854 and 1896, first Reciprocity and then Pro
tectionists principles and practices prevailed. Reciprocity
stood for freer trade practices while protetction stood for
stronger controls through higher tariffs. With this in mind,
let us notice how one and then the other policy prevailed.
Political leaders of the North that voted for Reciprocity with
it in mind that this was a step towards the annexation of

Canada to the United States. Southern leaders on the other
hand, were given to understand that Reciprocity was a de
pendable preventive against annexation. The Canadian Prov
inces were assured that it meant protection against American
expansionists. Canada, also, wanted its provisions of recipro
cal free trade in natural products in order to break through
the American twenty per cent tariff and to stimulate traffic
on the St. Lawrence River.19
There were some special interests in America that sup
ported the Reciprocity Treaty. The Lake States desired Re
ciprocity as a competitive alternative to the Lake Erie-Hud
son River-New York route. New England desired it as a
means to freer access to all the North Atlantic fisheries. New
states in the Northwest used it to support their objections to
the monoply held by Maine and the American lumbermen
who were dependent upon a hi�h tariff policy.
The smoothness with which this measure was enacted
into legislation witnessed to the skillful hands that directed
it. Notwithstanding the fact that the public interest was al
most completely absorbed in the controversy that was rag
ing over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, the Reciprocity Treaty
went through Congress without a hitch.
All went well in the application of the Reciprocity
measure for about three years. The Canadians, in the mean
time, awakened to some of the facts of their life. One fact
was that Canada had to raise substantial financial resources
in order to meet payments on the public debt that had been
incurred in the construction of her transportation facilities.
Furthermore, the Canadians came to realize that the Reci
procity Treaty covered natural goods but it did not cover
manufactured goods. Tariffs for revenue could be placed
thus on manufactured goods without breaking the provisions
of the treaty. When depression returned in 1857, both to
Europe and to America, the stage was set for the ready estab
lishment of an higher tariff.
In 1858, Canada organized her first protectionist asso
ciation. This Society for the Development of Canadian In
dustry went on record favoring 25 to 30 per cent duties on
manufactured goods that could be made in Canada. Legis
lation was enacted shortly that was in harmony with the

protectionist views except the rates were not set as high as
it had been suggested by the Society.20
The close bargaining attitudes which were adopted by
both sides contributed to the final abrogation of the treaty.
The spirit of the treaty was infringed long before the letter
was done away. Canada put duties on American manufactur
ed goods while the American Revenue officials interpreted
the "raw materials" of the treaty in the narrowest possible
sense.21
\Vhen the treaty was at last abrogated, many Canadians
regretted its termination and looked forward with forebodings.
They feared that the new arrangement would jeopardize the
economic gains that had been made under the treaty, and
that, somehow, they would be confined once more to the aus
tere limitations of their former condition in the colonial world.
The termination of the Reciprocity Treaty in 1866 marked
a milepost in both the timber industry and the economic de
velopment of Canada. Canadian representatives tried again
and again to persuade the Americans to reactivate a reciproc
ity policy before they were convinced that it was hopeless
to expect America to be a free market for Canadian raw ma
terials.
Canada turned reluctantly to Sir John MacDonald's
"National Policy." He charged that Canada would gain
nothing by pleading further with America for reciprocity. It
was an error to assume that the United States would change
its strong protectionist policy. The Canadian approach should
be to devise a way of self-reliance through a strong protec
tionist policy for her own industries. When commercial op
portunities in Canada were made inaccessible to the Amer
icans, then Washington would be induced to follow a more
conciliatory attitude towards Canada. This point of view
had its manifestation in the sustained economic battle through
tariffs. 22
MacDonald's "National Policy" included three economic
aspects: the settlement of the Northwest, an all-Canadian
trans-continental railroad, and an adequate tariff protection
to promote Canadian industries.23
The pressure of local vested interest that was exerted
upon the American Administration, loomed large as the de-

ctstve factor in the American action of terminating the Re
ciprocity Treaty. American lumber interests in Maine and
Michigan were particularly strong against the treaty's lum
ber clauses. It was the contention of the lumber interests of
these two states that Canadian competition brought prices
below the level that American producers could prosper.
On the other hand, there were certain Americans who saw
clearly the benefits that accrued to America under the treaty.
Joseph Howe was an example. In stating the case for the
treaty, he said that prices had not been adversely affected
under the treaty and that the American lumbermen had pros
pered. He claimed that Americans owned much of the timber
land of Canada. Furthermore, much of the timber from other
lands had been harvested actually by Americans.
James Little, a Canadian, was the exception to the
majority of Canadians who found the treaty desirable. Little
felt that Canada had lost by the treaty and that its renewal
would force prices down so far that Canadian timber would
thus be sacrificed to American interests. He made a signifi
cant statement that was to be reiterated later on. He pre
dicted: "The time will come when they will be glad to get
our lumber on any terms." A prediction, indeed, it prove<l
to be for American lumbermen soon were doing their best
to secure Canadian Pine.
The struggles for advantageous positions for their re
spective national economies by Canada and the United States
found expression, in part, through certain major tariff
changes. There were three major tariff bills that symboliz
ed the American changes. These were the McKinley Bill of
1890, the Wilson-Gorman Bill of 1894, and the Dingley Bill
of 1897.
Soon after the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty in
1866, the United States placed a 20 per cent general tax on
lumber. Canada responded by laying a duty of $1 per thou
sand feet on pine saw logs. In 1870, America put saw logs on
the free list but the 20 per cent ad valorem tax on lumber was
continued. Later, it changed the duty on lumber from an
ad valorem duty to a specific duty of $2 per thousand feet.
In the 1883 act, logs were still left on the free list but SO cents
was imposed on planed, tongued, and grooved lumber. In

1886, Canada raised the export duty to $2 per thousand. The
result was to induce certain lumber firms to move to and
saw lumber in Canada. The threatened exhaustion of Amer
ican timber in the Lake states forced Americans to seek a
policy that would assure her of a dependable supply from
Canadian sources. In 1888, Canada raised the duty on saw
logs to $3 per thousand. The next year it was reduced to
$2 per thousand, and in 1890, the duty was taken off al
together. This latter action was the result of the reciprocity
features of the McKinley Tariff Bill of 1890. This measure
provided for the removal of the $2 duty on Canadian lumber
if Canada removed her export duty on logs. This particularly
favored investments in the American mills in the Saginaw
Valley.
The agreement between the United States and Canada
stood as follows: Canada was to remove the export duty
on logs while the American tariff was reduced to $1 per
thousand feet. The Canadian action thus removed the
necessity of the migration of American mills to Canada at
this time. This agreement was kept on both sides. With the
$1 duty that the United States retained, America was able
to hold some restraint on coarse lumber imports.24
The McKinley Bill of 1890 followed the Morrill Act
of 1861 for the most part. It contained one provision, how
ever, that was to play a large part in the diplomatic and
commercial relations between Canada and the United States.
It was the retaliatory clause which bore the weight with both
Canadian and American lumbermen of a binding contract
that was to be cancelled only by common consent by both
parties.25 The $1 per thousand feet protection was remov
ed in the Wilson Bill but this did not have much effect, for
depression began in 1891 and things were upset for years.
Under the 'Vilson-Gorman Bill in 1894, the remaining duty
was removed so that for three years in lumber it was prac
tically a free trade arrangement between the two countries.
Lumber on the free list encouraged the removal of mills
from America to Ontario. A number of such mills were erect
ed during the life of the Wilson-Gorman Bill.26
Americans representing the protectionist sentiment in the
timber industry called a lumbermen's convention to consider

ways and means to secure higher protection for their section
of the American economy. J. E. Defebaugh, the historian
of the American lumber industry, was an active leader in
this movement. This convention settled on lobying as an
effective method to secure favorable legislative action by
Congress. They got what they wanted largely in the Ding
ley Tariff Bill of 1897. This measure was supposed to have
strengthened the American lumbermen's position in the Amer
ican domestic market by excluding cheaper and coarser Can
adian imports. 27
The Dingley Bill contained a built in weapon that was
supposed to be particularly effective as a retaliatory mea
sure against Canada if she should enact an export tax or
duty. Canada, however, found a more effective weapon
against America than just another tariff. It was not even
federal action. Ontario acted within her right and authority
as a sovereign province and forbade absolutely the exporta
tion of any logs that were cut from Crown lands after April
1, 1898. Timber cutting on Crown lands were only for those
who had licenses. The renewal of such licenses went right
on. This measure made it necessary to process in Canada the
timber that was cut there. The rapid migration of lumber
mills to Canada from the United States was the immediate
result. Thus, Ontario led the way in putting effective pres
sure upon the American lumber industry, for in Canada the
Provinces have reserved the power to regulate tariff and com
merce. The American lumbermen had no choice in the face
of these prohibitions and regulations but to acquiesce.28
IV.

Early 20th Century Trends in the Timber Industry

In the variation of lumber prices between 1860 and 1916
Wilson Compton has found two distinct cycles. The first
cycle was 1860-1880 while the second one was 1880-1916.
At the outset of each of these cycles the price of lumber was
relatively higher than that of other general goods. As the
cycle developed, however, this difference became less mark
ed. This had its bearing upon the volume of the exports of
lumber. For during the early phases when lumber prices
were higher, there was less reason to exploit the foreign
market, but during the latter part of the cycle when the
domestic price of lumber had leveled off, recourse was made

to the foreign market. Thus, 1860-1873 saw the volume of
lumber exports decline from 190 million to 134 million board
feet. On the other hand 1873-1880, during the slowing up
on domestic price of lumber, the annual average of lumber
exports picked up. In the Pacific Northwest lumber produc
tion helped swell this volume of exports. The Northwest was
unable to compete successfully with the Lake States for the
domestic market in the Middle West and the East.
In the first phase of the second cycle, 1880-1897, along
with a rapid rise of lumber prices the volume of lumber ex
ports increased almost seven fold. Exports from the Pacific
Northwest doubled. The 1897-1907 period was a record
breaker for both production and consumption of lumber, due
to a combination of ready availableness of timber supplies
and attractive prices. In fact, in the period of 1897-1913 the
volume of lumber, both imports and exports, rose to one of
the greatest levels. Prices were high everywhere: in Europe,
Asia, Australia, as well as America.29
American tariff policy in the twentieth century is repre
sented by the following acts of congress: the Payne-Aldrich
Tariff of 1909, the Underwood-Simmons Tariff of 1913, the
Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, the Smoot-Hawley Tar
iff of 1930, and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934.
The provisions in the Payne-Aldrich Bill prepared the
way to so;ne extent for the resumption of free trade in the
Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of 1913. Payne-Aldrich
tariff schedule provided for the reduction of duties on lum
ber from $2 to $1.25 per thousand feet. About this time
Taft's reciprocity proposals, including wood in its schedules,
were enacted by the American Congress but rejected by Can
ada.
In the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 the Republi
can majority in Congress succeeded in revising upwards
many items on the schedule, but lumber remained on the
free list. However, this was the first American tariff mea
sure that provided for a tax on logs as they entered Amer
ica. This was actually an attempt by the timber interests in
the Pacific Northwest to force free trade in logs in this area
for at this time the Great Lakes region was of secondary im-

portance. American tariff applied only to such logs that had
an export tax on them. All other logs entered free.30
Under the Smoot-Hawley measure a duty of $1 per
thousand feet was placed upon lumber. By 1935, this duty
had been increased to $4 per thousand feet. As a result of
these American tariff barriers, Canada had to search out
other markets for her lumber. She encouraged the resump
tion of imperial preferences. At the Ottawa Conference
Canada's efforts were crowned with success. In the long run
the scales were tipped so that British Columbia came out in
a more favorable position than that of Washington and Ore
gon. A housing boom in England marked an expanding
market for lumber and this was absorbed largely in the
Canadian timber industry.31
Here are some trends in Canadian tariff policy in the
early twentieth century. The formative period of the Domin
ion's commercial policy was in the two decades following Con
federation. During this time, tariff makers, who by necessity
were politicians, attempted to attract a majority of the elec
torate by embodying the American experience with protection
and the British precept of free trade. This period of com
promise and political inconsistency had run its course and the
protectionist viewpoint had triumphed by 1879. Tariff for
industrial expansion, as a constant element in Canadian econ
omic affairs, supplanted tariff for revenue. Both of Canada's
major political parties, during most of the last sixty years,
have preached freer trade but practiced protection.3 2
The course taken by Canada has been along traditional
lines. Little experimentation occurred apart from a widening
degree of rate discrimination favoring Empire countries be
fore and after the Ottawa Conference and the use of tariff
administration as a weapon of trade control during the depth
of the depression. The principal exchange manipulation was
the depreciation of Canadian money in terms of the United
States currency after the Sterling Bloc left the Gold Standard
in 1931.33
Four major objects have been found for Canadian tar
iff duties: The first purpose was to protect the Canadian
market from American exports. The Canadian market was
thus reserved for Canadian agricultural and industrial prod-

ucts. The second purpose was to force the foreign manufac
turing plants to move into Canada or to complete the man
ufacturing process in branch plants that already existed in
Canada. The third purpose was to raise tariffs on raw prod
ucts so high that plants in Canada would prefer to exploit na
tional resources. The fourth purpose was to direct the neces
sary purchases which Canada must make abroad on the basis
of reciprocity within the Empire, if possible, and thus com
pensate for the lost American market. In the three general
tariff revisions the first three purposes were realized. The
fourth objective was achieved in the agreements at the Ottawa
Conference in 1932.34
Canada never has been a participant in a truly free
trade situation. She was given a particularly harsh schooling
by the United States after the end of the Reciprocity Treaty
in 1866. The American variety of protectionism to which
Canada was subjected from 1865 until 1909 was especially
severe. It was moderated somewhat between 1909 and 1920,
only to be intensified through the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of
1930 and the tariffs of 1932 which appeared to be designed
to exclude Canadian lumber.35
These matters led Canada to a final and thorough com
mitment to protectionism and tariff retaliation. This was
made so, in part, by pressure from the United States. How
ever, Canada justified her tariff foremost by insisting that
payment for the construction of her costly transportation
system was dependent upon these import duties. So adamant
was Canada's committment to protectionism that even when
the American government took effective action and adopted
genuine reciprocity measures towards Canada, it was Can
adian action that threw this out. In spite of the fact that
Canada and the United States carried on from 1865 to 1935
an almost unbroken tariff war, the startling fact is that trade
between these two countries reached a greater volume than
between any other two countries in the world.
Ill-will in Canadian-American relations following the
first World War grew and spread like a crop of bad weeds�
Canadian attitude toward America's role in that war and
the tariff struggle were factors in increasing bad feelings.
The American tariffs of 1922 and 1930 were met by the

Canadian tariffs of 1927 and 1930. The American protec
tionist provided an almost impenetrable barrier to some Can
adian products in the American market, such as, lumber,
hard wheat, dairy products, cattle, maple sugar, etc. On the
other hand, Canadian tariff was equally effective in shutting
off the movement of some American manufactured goods into
the Canadian market.
Canada had availed herself by 1932 of the advantages
of the preferential position within the British Commonwealth
of Nations. In this advantageous position Canada develop
ed three levels of tariff rates. The first was that of a power
within the Commonwealth agreement of 1932. This was a
preferred status with tariffs lowered to Canadian goods. The
second was based on special treaty relations with Canada.
The third category was characterized by the highest rates.
America was included in this. This tariff war had accentuat
ed the psychological difference between America and Canada.
Finally, intellectual leaders in both Canada and the United
States were shocked over the intolerable predicament of this
impasse into which their countries had fallen. These lead
ers felt with equal urgency the necessity of finding a remedy.
Professor Bemis has pointed out the efforts and the results
that came of these mutual concerns among American and Can•
adian scholars:
With the support of the Carnegie Endowment for In
ternational Peace, a series of biennial conferences
(1935, 1937, 1939, 1941) on Canadian-American affairs
. . . brought together statesmen, scholars, philan
thropists, diplomatists, and journalists of both na
tions, to hammer out common problems on the anvil
of determined friendship, with utter frankness as is
possible only between Canadians and Americans who,
let it be repeated, regard themselves as independent
of each other rather than foreign to each other. These
extra-official conferences, and the continuing studies
that they helped put in motion, restored the old tone
of fellowship, and made themselves felt in official
policy.36

In conclusion, perhaps we can stroke a bright note. The
growth of understanding that came out of the extended
conversations of scholar and culture leaders was parallel
in matters of state and commerce. The extended negotiations
between Canadian, British, and American diplomats bore fruit

in the trade agreement that was signed in Washington on
November 17, 1938. It had been, indeed, a triangular af
fair for British and Canadian relations were so compli
cated and interwoven that negotiations had to be handled
with the greatest care and patience. When discount is made
for the agreement being to some extent a device in the cold
war leading up to World War II, there is certainly enough
left to justify the claim that it marked an important step in
greater political harmony and economic accord-characteris
tics that had been too little known in the previous seventy
five years of Canadian-American relations.
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